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policies. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Government in the Sunshine
Act represents such a halting step forward. 1 6 Accordingly, this note has
attempted to demonstrate how fundamental compromises in the new law will
affect its impact and to show that the key provisions discussed here tend to
conflict. The new law's broad definitions are severely limited by the exemptions, while weak enforcement provisions are strengthened by the transcript
requirements.
Such compromises were probably necessary to attract broad support for
the Act. The contradictory provisions will cause confusion, however, as
Congress has given the judiciary an imperfect picture of its intent. Nevertheless, it would seem more appropriate and desirable to consider the Government in the Sunshine Act as a first step with more to come. As such, it
represents a significant advancement toward administrative accountability.
Dramatic developments have taken place under the Freedom of Information
Act, and there is reason to expect similar results under Government in
the Sunshine.
MAURICE BASKIN

THE MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT AND THE RECORDING
ACT: IS HARMONIC COEXISTENCE POSSIBLE?
Florida's recording act,' designed to protect subsequent bona fide purchasers against prior unrecorded interests, and its marketable record title
act (MRTA), 2 designed to promote greater reliance on record title, though
eminently consistent in their objectives, are difficult to reconcile in their
application. Although the recording act states that only prior unrecorded
interests are invalid against subsequent bona fide purchasers, the act has
been construed to render ineffectual against innocent purchasers all interests,
recorded or unrecorded, that are not discoverable in a reasonable, indexguided search of title. The MRTA attempts to accomplish its objectives of
clearing old defects from land titles, limiting the period of record search,
and defining marketability by extinguishment of all old interests of record
that are not specifically preserved. In so doing, the act purports to preserve
196.

A recent General Accounting Office report which surveyed the first six months of

Sunshine Law operations revealed the slow pace achieved so far in opening agency meetings. The report indicated that 527 of the 1,003 meetings between March and September,
1977 remained completely or partially closed. Furthermore, only 193 of the closed meetings apparently fell within recognized exemptions. Miami Herald, Nov. 21, 1977, §D, at 13,
col. 1.

*EDITOR's NoTE: This note received the 1977 Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund award for
the best paper submitted at the University of Florida in the field of real property.
1. FLA. STAT. §695.01 (1975). For the full text of this statute see note 39 infra.
2. FLA. STAT. §§712.01-.10 (1975).
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as "exceptions to marketability"' certain unrecorded, and undiscoverable 5
interests that the recording act renders invalid. Thus, unless those interests
are merely illusory, the recording act must be found inapplicable to them.
The recording act can indeed be held inapplicable if purchasers are deemed
to have notice of such interests; therefore, they are no longer bona fide and
entitled to the protection of the act. This analysis casts serious doubt on the
MRTA's express provision that the act shall not be construed to affect the
operation of the recording act.6
Through a historical development of the doctrines of void title and constructive and actual notice as they impact on the recording system, this note
seeks to reveal the fundamental nature of the operational conflicts between
the recording act and the MRTA. An examination of the inconsistencies
between the two acts, at such a basic level, facilitates the formulation of
proposals for reconciliation in their operation.
THE OluGiNs oF NoncE
The equitable doctrine of notice made its initial appearance in the field
of real property in the mid-1600's when the chancery courts found it an
effective device to regulate trusts.7 A purchaser of land from a trustee was
obligated to carry out the terms of the trust if he had notice of its existence
at the time of purchase; therefore, the purchaser frequently sought to
escape notice of another's equitable interests in the property. In an effort
to eliminate the benefits obtained from active avoidance of knowledge, the
chancery court ruled that purchasers were deemed to have notice of those
interests that a diligent and reasonable investigation of the vendor's title
would have revealed." A reasonable investigation at that time encompassed
an examination of the vendor's deeds, an inspection of the land itself, and
interrogation of the witnesses to previous liveries of seisin.o If a diligent investigation had been made, the purchaser was bound by actual notice of any
interests thereby revealed. If, however, a purchaser failed to make a reasonable investigation of the vendor's title, he was nevertheless bound by implied notice of any interests or claims that inquiries would have revealed.o
3. Section 712.03 is entitled "Exceptions to marketability." FLA. STAT. §712.03 (1975).
See note 69 infra.
4. For example, §712.03(5) preserves unrecorded easements. See text accompanying notes
151-154 infra for a detailed examination of this subsection.
5. One interest not discoverable in an index-guided search of title and thus deemed
unrecorded for purposes of §695.01 but preserved by §712.03 is a recently recorded wild deed.
6. FLA. STAT. §712.07 (1975).
7. G. CnsmaE, THE MoDERN LAW OF REAL PRoPERTY 60 (10th ed. 1967). The author,
having traced the development of the trust as a means of avoiding the feudal obligation,
examines the courts' attempt to cope with this new form of conveyancing. For an historical
survey of conveyancing and notice, see generally J. BREwsTER, THE CoNVEYANCE OF EsTATEs
IN FEE By Dana (1904).
8.

G. CHEsmE, supra note 7, at 61.

9. Id. at 61-64.
10. The burden of investigation thus imposed on purchasers was easily justified by

the court since failure to procure the vendor's deeds was deemed evidence of a fraudulent
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This latter form of notice was denominated constructive notice."
NOTICE AND THE RECORDING

AcTs

In the United States the equitable doctrines of notice took on new significance with the advent of the recording system. Prior to the Revolutionary
War, every colony had adopted legislation governing the recording of conveyances in public records. 2 The first recording act, the Massachusetts act,
had the declared purpose of "avoiding all fraudulent conveyances, & that
every man may know what estate or interest other men may have in any
houses, lands or other hereditamants [sic] they are to deale in." 13 Referring
to the numerous recording acts later adopted, Patton notes their objectives
as "the original one of securing a prompt recordation of all conveyances by
according priority of right to the purchaser who is first to record his conveyance, the equitable one of protecting subsequent purchasers against secret
and unknown conveyances and agreements by reason of which they would
otherwise be prejudiced, and the constructive one of preserving an accessible
history of each title . . . [from which reliable information could be ob-

tained]."'14
Even those acts designed to accomplish only the first and third objectives,
such as the original Massachusetts act, were quickly construed by the courts
to exclude purchasers with notice from their protection.' 5 Therefore, although priority of recording may still be relevant in some states, 16 lack of
notice is the threshold qualification that must be satisfied to entitle one to
7
the protection of modern recording acts.'
attempt to escape notice. Id. at 64. Similarly, the chancery courts held that registry of a
deed pursuant to the Statute of Enrollments by one having notice of a prior conveyance
was a fraud upon the purchaser. The subsequent purchaser, then holder of the legal title
under the statute, was deemed an equitable trustee for the prior purchaser. I R. PATTON &
C. PATTON, PATRON ON LAND TriS §8, at 32 (2d ed. 1957) (citing Le Neve v. Le Neve,
27 Eng. Rep. 893 (1747); Blades v. Blades, 1667-1744 21 Eng. Rep. 1100, pl. 12, 1 Eq. Cas.
Ab. 358, pl. 12).
11. A purchaser was held to have constructive notice of anything he failed to discover
either: "1. because he did not investigate the title properly; or 2. because he did not
inquire for deeds relating to the property." G. CnmsiRE, supra note 7, at 61.
12.

1 R. PATRON & C. PATrON, supra note 10, §6.

13.

Beale, The Origin of the System of Recording Deeds in America, 19 GREEN BAG

335, 337 (1907) (quoting 1 R

ORDS OF THE GOvERNoR AND COMPANY OF MASSACHUsETrs 306

(1853)).
14.

1 R. PATRON & C. PATrON, supra note 10, §6, at 15-16.

15. See, e.g., Marshall v. 'Fisk, 6 Mass. 24, 30-31 (1809); Reading of Judge Trowbridge,
3 Mass. 573, 575 (1807). See also Jackson v. Burgott, 10 Johns. 457, 460-61 (N.Y. 1813).
The original Massachusetts act was amended in 1836 to conform to that judicial construction.
16. Notice-race recording statutes require a subsequent purchaser to be without notice
and first to record the deed in order to receive protection. For a discussion of such
statutes, see I R.

PATRON 8C C. PATrON, supra note 10, §10.

17. This proposition does not hold in North Carolina and Louisiana, the only states
that have retained pure race recording acts. See I R. PATRON & C. PATRON, supra note 10,
§8, at 33, 35.
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Notice in the United States, as in England, may be either actual or constructive.18 The advent of recorded written conveyances, however, has considerably changed the nature of constructive notice.1 9 A purchaser is no longer
held to notice of every interest that would be revealed by an examination of
the vendor's deeds and inquiries made of witnesses to past title transfers.
Rather, as the recording system was designed to provide accessible and
reliable title information, 20 the public records are now the principal source
of notice. The only nonrecorded interests of which a purchaser is deemed
to have notice are those that would have been revealed by an inspection
L21
But recordation alone does not always give rise to notice
of the land itself.
of a document and its contents. Record noice is limited to those instruments
in the "vendor's record chain of title,"22 to any other recorded instruments
that involve persons who were owners in the record chain and that were recorded during that person's term of ownership, 23 and inquiries suggested by
any such instruments. 24 Thus, except for possession inconsistent with record
2
title, the record chain of title defines the boundaries of constructive notice. 5
Originally, a record chain of title included all recorded instruments affecting title to the land in question. As the number of recorded instruments
rapidly increased, however, it became impracticable to require a purchaser
to search through all the records to find those relevant to a particular parcel.
Separate statutes were enacted providing for indexes to the past and future
records.2 6 An index-guided search has been judicially accepted as a reason18. Id. §14. Constructive notice hereinafter will be used to refer to any type of implied
notice.
19. "It is implied or stated in countless cases that the field of notice and search is that
of the chain of title." Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93
U. PA. L. REV. 125, 166 (1944). "The recording acts are an extension to title records of
the doctrine of notice, with the result that a purchaser bound thereby with constructive
notice of a prior right takes subject thereto." 1 R. PATTON & C. PATroN, supra note 10, §19,
at 97-98.
20. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
21. 1 R. PATRON & C. PATTON, supra note 10, §14, at 64-73. Constructive notice implied
by possession inconsistent with record title is derived from the historical precedent that
title was once proved by possession alone. Although recorded conveyances supplanted the
need for livery of seisin, possession is still deemed evidence of title. See, e.g., Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Roper, 68 Fla. 299, 67 So. 115 (1914); Massey v. Hubbard, 18 Fla. 688,
694 (1882) (deed unrecorded but possession of property gave notice of title).
22. For an explanation of those instruments constituting a record chain of title, see 2
M. MERR LL, MERRILL ON NoTicE §979 (1952).
23. For example, if a judgment were recorded against an owner in the record chain of
title while he was owner of that parcel, a purchaser would be held to notice of that lien.
24. "IThe record is notice of all facts discoverable by the inquiries which it reasonably suggests." M. MERRML, supra note 22, §995, at 585. The fact that inquiry notice has
the same effect as constructive notice implied from the records, that is, rendering a subsequent purchaser not bona fide and not protected by the recording acts, is Professor Philbrick's principal objection to current interpretations of notice vis-A-vis the recording acts.
See generally Philbrick, supra note 19.
25. See, e.g., 2 M. MERRILL, supra note 22, §978; 8A G. THOMPSON, Co~.sammARMS ON
THE MODERN LAw OF REAL PROPERTY §4340 (1924).
26. E.g., FLA. REV. STAT. §1391 (1892), which provided: "For the purpose of . . .
recording he [the clerk of the circuit court] shall keep: . . . Indexes, alphabetical, direct
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able search of title2 7 and therefore should establish the limits of constructive

notice implied from recorded instruments. 28 The courts have followed this
view with respect to wild deeds and other instruments in which neither
the name of the grantee nor that of the grantor is discoverable in a reasonable search.29 In so doing, the doctrine of constructive notice has controlled
the interpretation given to the statutory language of the recording acts.30 On
occasion, however, the courts have departed from this concept to hold purchasers to constructive notice of instruments properly filed but misplaced
and inverse, to all the foregoing books." See also P. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TrrLF-s §3 (2d ed.
1970). The usual index lists instruments under the names of the grantor and grantee of that
instrument. Using the indexes a title examiner searches the name of the current vendor
until he is named as grantee of the land, the name of the vendor's grantor until he is
named as grantee, and so on. When ownership is traced back to the sovereign the process
reverses, and each grantee's name traced until he becomes a grantor. See 1 R. PATrON &
C. PATTON, supra note 10, §67; Cross, The Record "Chain of Title" Hyprocrisy, 57 CoLuM.
L. REv. 787, 788-89 (1957). Thus, although the indexes have not been declared part of
the record, they determine the time span over which a particular name is searched. This
is true in a majority of states, although Iowa, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington,
and Wisconsin make the index a part of the record. I R. PATTON & C. PATTON, Supra note
10, §68. See also 2 M. MERRILL, supra note 22, §§1069-1072. One commentator referred to
this time span as the period requiring search in the records against a particular owner or
chain of owners or interested persons, not a strict chain of transfers. Cross, supra at 787.
27. E.g., Pyles v. Brown, 189 Pa. 164, 167-68, 42 A. 11, 12-13 (1899). A recording act
that provided that recording of any instrument gave subsequent purchasers notice thereof
and a recently enacted indexing statute were in effect at the time of the suit. The plaintiff
urged the court to construe those statutes to include a recorded morgage executed by one
other than the record owner among those instruments providing notice. The court found
that the statutes were not intended to impose such a burden on future purchasers. The
fact that a deed or mortgage was recorded and indexed was only notice to those persons
who would find the instrument. in a search of their record chain of title. The court stated
that the construction urged by the plaintiff "would require examination of all conveyances
to, as well as by, anyone whose name appears in the record chain of title. . . . [The acts
were not] intended to create a duty in this regard, nor to enlarge or extend the rule as to
constructive notice." Id. See also Veazie v. Parker, 23 Me. 170 (1848) (if one traces the
record title to the vendor and ascertains that he has not conveyed of record, then a reasonable search has been made even though a prior grantee of the vendor had recorded a
mortgage but not the deed through which he acquired title).
28. That is, the English doctrine of constructive notice obligated one to make a reasonable investigation of title or be bound by the interests that an investigation would have
revealed. If an index-guided search is deemed sufficient to constitute a reasonable investigation of title, then constructive notice of only those interests that a search would reveal should
be implied.
29. E.g., Poladian v. Johnson, 85 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1955) (wild deed not constructive
notice); Mansfield v. Johnson, 51 Fla. 239, 252-53, 40 So. 196, 200-01 (1906) (recital concerning property but not in chain of title is not constructive notice). See also 2 M. MERRILL,
supra note 22, §983; 8A G. THOMPSON, supra note 25, §4340.
30. The language of most recording acts merely requires that an instrument be recorded, not that it be recorded within the record chain of title, to be effective against subsequent purchasers. One commentator has noted that the original purpose of recording acts
(in his view, the elimination of the need for livery of seisin by requiring that an instrument be recorded to have legal effect) has been defeated "by the equitable doctrine of
notice that was imposed upon [the system] by early judicial legislation. The recording
statutes have in fact been made merely an extension of that doctrine." Philbrick, supra
note 19, at 128-29.
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or mishandled in the clerk's office even though they would not be discoverable in a reasonable search.:3 Similarly, instruments that would be found in
a reasonable search but that are improperly executed or acknowledged do
32
not give constructive notice of the interests purportedly conveyed.
In any event, a reasonable search that fails to reveal any irregularities
does not assure a purchaser of good title to the property. A subsequent purchaser without notice is only protected if his grantor held legal title to the
land. 2 For example, a forged instrument in the chain of title has no legal
effect and cannot convey an interest in land regardless of its proper appearance in the records. Similarly, defects in the capacity of persons named as
grantors or grantees, homestead interests, and incomplete deliveries may
not appear from the records but do render void the transactions involved.34
Even though a purchaser is without notice of such defects, the recording acts
35
do nothing to protect him from entirely void title transfers.
Recording: A FloridaFocus
The Florida recording statute is closely analogous in origin and interpretation to those described above. Florida continued to register land according to Spanish practice until 1828,36 when the state's recording statute was
first enacted. 37 With only one substantive amendment, which added the last
two paragraphs,3 s the original act remains intact after 149 years.3 9
31. E.g., Federal Land Bank v. Dekle, 108 Fla. 555, 148 So. 756 (1933) (despite typographical error in recording that changes description, notice takes place from time of filing
and is not destroyed by errors in recording); First Nat'l Bank v. Evans, 100 Fla. 740,
130 So. 18 (1980) (mortgage is constructive notice from the time it was fied despite clerk's
failure to record for five months). See also 2 M. MERRILL, supra note 22, §§1066-71; Cross,
supra note 26, at 790-93.
32. E.g., Keech v. Enriquez, 28 Fla. 597, 10 So. 91 (1891) (no proof of execution
that would authorize recording; therefore, record not constructive notice). See also 1 R.
PATrON & C. PATTON, supra note 10, §62; 8A G. THOMPSON, supra note 25, §4341.
33. See J. BRxwsrz, supra note 7, §426. See also 2 M. MEmL, supra note 22, §1024.
34. E.g., Wright v. Blocker, 144 Fla. 428, 198 So. 88 (1940). See J. BREwsTER, supra note

7, §427.
35. "IT]he record can have no greater effect than knowledge of the document itself
would have, and, in the case of a void act, this would be notice simply of a nullity. Recording does not validate an invalid instrument." 2 M. MamuL=, supra note 22, §1024, at
642-43 (citing Gardner v. Cole, 21 Iowa 205 (1866); Kennedy Pasture Co. v. State, 111 Tex.
200, 231 S.W. 683 (1921), cert. denied, 258 U.S. 617 (1922)). See also Reed v. Fain, 145 So.

2d 858 (Fla.1961).

36. 1 R. PATTON & C. PATTON, supra note 10, §6.
37. Comment, Protection and Alienability of Real Property Interests Under the Florida
Recording Statutes, 6 MLQmi L.Q. 595, 595 (1951). The author stated that territorial Florida
passed a recording statute on November 15, 1828, which was the predecessor to the current
FrA. STAT. §695.01 (1975).
38. 1941 Fla. Laws, ch. 20954.

39. In its current version the recording act provides:
"695.01 Conveyances to be recorded. "(1) No conveyance transfer or mortgage of real property, or of any interest therein,
nor any lease for a term of 1 year or longer, shall be good and effectual in law or equity
against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration and without notice,
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Consistent with statutory interpretation in other jurisdictions, the Florida
supreme court has stated that the objective of the act is the prevention of
fraud through concealment- or the protection of purchasers for value against
secret deeds of grantors.4- As elsewhere, the purchaser must be without notice
to receive statutory protection. And, as recorded instruments in the vendor's
chain of title provide purchasers with constructive notice of their existence,
the purchaser is not protected against those prior recorded interests. 42 Florida
courts agree that an instrument must be in the vendor's record chain of title, 43
or suggested thereby, 44 to constitute constructive notice although the statute
does not so require. The instrument, however, need not be recorded in the
proper book or index. 45 On the other hand, instruments in the chain of title
unless the same be recorded according to law; nor shall any such instrument made or
executed by virtue of any power of attorney be good or effectual in law or in equity
against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration and without notice
unless the power of attorney be recorded before the accruing of the right of such creditor
or subsequent purchaser.
"(2) Grantees by quitclaim, heretofore or hereafter made, shall be deemed and held
to be bona fide purchasers without notice within the meaning of the recording acts;
"(3) Provided, however, that. this section shall not apply to quitclaims heretofore made,
the priority of which shall be contested by suit commenced within 1 year of the effective
date of this law." FLA. STAT. §695.01 (1975).
40. Billings v. Stark, 15 Fla. 297 (1875) (recording of deed from tax commission
would have prevented record owner's fraudulent sale to innocent purchaser).
41. Emerson v. Ross' Ex'x, 17 Fla. 122, 135 (1879) (purchaser from administrator of
decedent's estate prevailed over daughter of decedent who held an earlier unrecorded deed).
One commentator claims that the original purpose of recording acts was to invalidate
all unrecorded interests. See Philbrick, supra note 19, at 127-29. The Florida supreme court,
however, expressly rejected this view. In Carr v. Thomas, 18 Fla. 736 (1882), the court
found an earlier version of the recording act unconstitutional. That section provided that
any deed not recorded within six months of its execution was void. With respect to the
desirability of such a provision the court opined: "We are loath to pronounce any act
of deliberate legislation to be invalid, but when an act like this, which in effect is promotive of fraud in various ways, comes before us we feel no reluctance in declaring its invalidity, if there is ground for so doing. The section in terms gives to a second purchaser
or grantee of land from the former owner a good title against a former grantee who has
bought and paid for the land, though the second purchaser may know of the former
conveyance, if the first deed is not recorded within six months after its execution. As to
the second deed the first is declared void, absolutely, in law, if recorded after six months,
and though the second is executed after the recording of the first. A provision so mischievous in its effects can hardly have been said to have been deliberate legislation." l1d.
at 747. See also Fong v. Batton, 214 So. 2d 649, 652 (Fla. 1968); Moyer v. Clark, 72 So. 2d
905, 906 (Fla. 1954).
42. E.g., Latin Am. Bank v. Rogers, 87 Fla. 147, 99 So. 546 (1924). The language of
FLA. STAT. §695.01 (1975) is potentially inconsistent with this well-accepted interpretation.
The statute provides that no interest shall be good against subsequent purchasers without
notice unless the interest is recorded. That language could be construed to mean that even
if the interest is recorded, one can nevertheless qualify as a subsequent purchaser without
notice.
43. E.g., Poladian v. Johnson, 85 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1955); Mansfield v. Johnson, 51 Fla.
239, 40 So. 196 (1906).
44. E.g., Pierson v. Bill, 138 Fla. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939); Sapp v. Warner, 105 Fla. 245,
141 So. 124 (1932).
45. E.g., Cawthon v. Stearns Culver Lumber Co., 60 Fla. 313, 316, 53 So. 738, 739
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but improperly executed, 46 proved47 or acknowledged 8 do not provide constructive notice. Thus a purchaser is bound by constructive notice of some
instruments not discoverable in a reasonable search of title (those improperly
indexed), and not bound by voidable instruments that are discoverable in a
reasonable search (improperly executed instruments). It would seem, however,
that if the search were in fact made the purchaser would acquire some form
of actual or inquiry notice 49 of the interests of the parties to defective instruments. 50 Florida courts have also adopted the void title doctrine, which holds
that recorded instruments procured by fraud, duress, or forgery have no legal
effect and neither constitute constructive notice of their existence nor operate
to pass title.51 A purchaser relying on the record must bear the risk that such
instruments may form a part of his chain of title.

As a result of the many risks inherent in an index-guided record search,
and in order to provide purchasers with greater title security, reliance has
shifted from the public records to abstracts of title. Abstracts, which compile

all recorded instruments involving a particular parcel of land, will reveal
improperly indexed instruments deemed within the purchaser's chain of
title. Such documents would also reveal some defective instruments of record
and wild instruments that involve the parcel in question. A purchaser
having thus received actual notice of a wild or voidable instrument can no
longer safely ignore it. The bliss, and protection, of ignorance is perhaps
outweighed by the knowledge that no unpleasant surprises lurk in the future.
It is, however, still possible that the forged or fraudulent nature of some

conveyances will remain undiscovered.
THE FLORIDA MARKETABLE REcoRD

TiTLE ACT

Despite the movement to the use of abstracts in title examination, the
ever-increasing numbers of recorded documents and court proceedings concerning titles to real estate have rendered the conveyancing process unduly
slow and expensive.52 Legal scholars have labored ardently in attempts to
(1910) (deed recorded in mortgage book, not deed record book, is still constructive
notice); Ivey v. Dawley, 50 Fla. 537, 39 So. 498 (1905) (mortgage recorded in miscellaneous
book provides constructive notice).
46. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164, 192 So. 637 (1939) (although wife
executed deed without knowledge of its contents and the recorded instrument would not be
constructive notice, wife now estopped from denying its validity).
47. E.g., Edwards v. Thom, 25 Fla. 222, 254-56, 5 So. 707, 712-13 (1889) (proof of signing but not of sealing or delivery, therefore record not constructive notice).
48. E.g., Keech v. Enriquez, 28 Fla. 597, 10 So. 91 (1891).
49. There is widespread dispute over proper terminology in this area. See 1 R. BoYmE,
FLORMA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §§27.01-.03 (1976). Inquiry notice will be considered
a type of constructive notice and will be used to refer to the notice implied by possession
or by the defects in recorded instruments that render inquiry into the possible interests of
others prudent.
50. This type of notice is frequently implied. But see Philbrick, supra note 19, at 125-86.
51. E.g., Wright v. Blocker, 144 Fla. 428, 198 So. 88 (1940) (forged deed is void and
does not provide constructive notice); Houston v. Forman, 92 Fla. 1, 109 So. 297 (1926)
(record of deed fraudulently procured from escrow agent is not constructive notice).
52. P. BAsYE, supra note 26, §5. In many areas a complete chain of title back to the
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draft a comprehensive statute that would safely permit a title search limited
5 4
to only recently recorded instruments, 53 clear old defects of record, establish
5
perimeters within which marketability would be determined, reduce the
57
56
number of quiet title actions, and reduce the costs of abstracts and closings.
The Model Marketable Title Act, proposed in 1960, was designed to accomplish those objectives. 58 In 1963 Florida enacted its marketable record
title act,59 an amended version of the Model Act, for the express purpose of
"simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to
rely on a record title as described . . . [therein]. 60
Essentially, the Model Act and its variants provide that when a person
has a record title to land for a designated duration, adverse claims and
interests that stem from transactions occurring before that period are extinguished unless the adverse claimant seasonably records a notice to preserve
his interest. The root of title, defined as a title transaction purporting to
create or transfer the estate claimed which is the last title transaction to
have been recorded at least thirty years prior to the time when marketability
is being determined, is the foundation of marketable record title.61 Marketable record title is defined by the Model Act as a title of record that operates
to extinguish claims predating the root of title and that is subject to certain
2
enumerated interests and defects. 6 The language and organization of the
Florida act indicate, however, that it was designed to do more than simply
define a marketable record title. Instead the chapter purports legislatively to
sovereign will cover 150 years and include scores of documents. L. SlaES & C. TAYLOR, THE
(1960).
BY LEGISLATION
IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING
53. L. SInEs & C. TAYLOR. supra note 52, at 297. See also Note, The Indiana Marketable Title Act of 1963: A Survey, 40 IND. L.J. 21 (1964). Because of the numerous exceptions in the MRTA, however, an examination of all recorded instruments is necessary to
determine if any excepted interests remain.
54. See Pray, Title Standards and Marketable Title Act, 38 OKLA. B.J. 611, 614 (1967).
55. See Hicks, The Oklahoma Marketable Record Title Act, 9 TULSA L.J. 68, 73 (1973).
56. One commentator attributes the decline in such suits to increasing utilization of
title insurance. Jossman, The Forty Year Marketable Title Act: A Reappraisal, 37 DET. L.J.
422, 424 (1960).
57. Simes, The Improvement of Conveyancing: Recent Developments, 34 OKLA. B.J.
2357, 2360 (1963).
58. The Model Act was the product of a research project on the improvement of
conveyancing sponsored by the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the
American Bar Association. The Act was largely a synthesis of similar acts then in existence,
namely the Michigan, Wisconsin, and Ontario marketable title statutes. L. SIMES & C.
TAYLOR, supra note 52, at 6-10. Virtually every state enacting or amending marketable
title legislation since 1960 has incorporated a close approximation of the Model Act. Such
statutes are currently in force in fourteen states: Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Indiana,
Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, South
Dakota, Utah, and Vermont. P. BAsYE, supra note 26, §§171-192.
59. Marketable Record Title Act, 1963 Fla. Laws, ch. 63-133, §§1-10 (current version
at FLA. STAT. §§712.01-.10 (1975)).
60. Id. §10 (current version at FLA. STAT. §712.10 (1975)).
61. This definition is paraphrased from FLA. STAT. §712.01(2) (1975). The Model Act
provides that the root of title must be at least forty years old. The effective date of the
root of title is the date on which it was recorded. MODEL MART rABLE TITLE ACT §8(e).
62. See MODEL MARKErABL. TITLE Acr §§3, 8(a).
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define marketability itself.63 Section 712.03 even characterizes its exceptions
as exceptions to marketability rather than exceptions to a marketable record
title. 4
This contention is further supported by the extinguishment provisions
of the act. Section 712.04 provides that a marketable record title shall be
held free and clear of all preroot interests except hose preserved by section
712.03. 65 In other words, the interests preserved under section 712.03 are
the only preroot interests that remain and might impair marketability. Since
only preroot interests are extinguished, however, any postroot interests remain
and might impair marketability. But section 712.03 purports to preserve
some postroot interests which would not be subject to extinguishment in any
event. 6 Therefore, unless these clauses of section 712.03 are simply construed
as meaningless, the legislature apparently intended to enumerate those postroot, as well as preroot, interests that might impair marketability, thereby,
in effect, defining marketability.
This conjecture of legislative intent is even more strongly supported by
the extinguishment provision of section 712.02. Section 712.02 provides that
a marketable record title shall be held free and dear of all claims except
those enumerated in section 712.03.67 If all interests, both preroot and post63. A distinction must be drawn between the marketable record title that is defined
by statute and the marketable title that a court would force upon a vendee. A marketable
title is "one which will be secured against loss by attack or annoyance by litigation," one
which a reasonably prudent man would accept, one free from all reasonable doubt, or more
explicitly, "one which does not contain any manner of defect or outstanding interest or
claim which may conceivably operate to defeat or impair the interest which is bargained
for and intended to be conveyed." P. BASYE, supra note 26, §371, at 741-42. In contrast, a
marketable record title is explicitly made subject to certain exceptions that could render
a title unmarketable.
64. The Model Act, in contrast, characterizes the list of rights preserved as interests
to which a marketable record title is subject rather than exceptions to marketability.
MODEL MARKETABLE TrLE Acr §2.

65. "Interests extinguished by marketable record title. -Subject to the matters stated
in s. 712.03, such marketable record title shall be free and clear of all estates, interests,
claims, or charges whatsoever, the existence of which depends upon any act, title transaction,
event or omission that occurred prior to the effective date of the root of title. All such
estates, interests, claims or charges, however denominated, whether such estates, interests,
claims or charges are or appear to, be held or asserted by a person sui juris or under a
disability, whether such person is within or without the state, whether such person is
natural or corporate, or is private or governmental, are hereby declared to be null and
void, except that this chapter shall not be deemed to affect any right, title or interest of
the United States, Florida or any of its officers, boards, commissions or other agencies
reserved in the patent or deed by which the United States, Florida or any of its agencies
parted with title." FLA. STAT. §717.04 (1975).
This provision mirrors the extinguishment section of the Model Act. MODEL MAETABLE
TrrLE AcT §3.
66. For example, the rights protected by §712.03(4) - those arising out of transactions
recorded subsequent to the root of tide-are by definition not preroot interests subject
to extinguishment.
67. FLA. SrAT. §712.02 (1975): "Marketable record title. -Any person" having the legal
capacity to own land in this state, who, alone or together with his predecessors in title, has
been vested with any estate in land of record for 30 years or more, shall have a marketable
record title to such estate in said land, which shall be free and dear of all claims except
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root, are extinguished unless preserved by section 712.03, the interests
enumerated in section 712.03 are the only interests that remain and might
impair marketability. 68 Clearly, under the operation of section 712.02, section
712.03 enumerates all potential exceptions to marketability.
Among those claims and interests preserved by section 712.03 are "[e]states
or interests, easements, and use restrictions disclosed by and defects inherent
in the muniments of title on which said estate is based beginning with the
root of title" and "[e]states, interests, claims, or charges arising out of a title
transaction which has been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the
root of title." Also preserved are easements in use, rights of persons in possession and of persons in whose name property taxes for such land were assessed
within the last three years. Finally, any interest, claim, or estate may be
preserved by filing a notice in accordance with the procedure described in
sections 712.05 and 712.06.69
the matters set forth as exceptions of marketability in s. 712.03. A person shall have a
marketable record title when the public records disclosed a record title transaction affecting
the title to the land which has been of record for not less than 30 years purporting to
create such estate either in: (1) The person claiming such estate; or (2) Some other
person from whom, by one or more title transactions, such estate has passed to the person
claiming such estate, with nothing appearing of record, in either case, purporting to divest
such claimant of the estate claimed."
68. Recently the Florida supreme court stated that only those interests specifically
enumerated in §712.03 were saved from extinction by the act. The court, quoting a passage
from the federal district court opinion authored by Judge Reed in the same case, stated:
"The specific enumeration of exceptions to the act in Section 712.03 and the specific provision in Section 712.05 for the protection of valid claims indicates a legislative intent to
exclude no other claims from extinction by the operation of Sections 712.02 and 712.04."
ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Wadsworth, 346 So. 2d 1004, 1012 (Fla. 1977) (quoting ITT Rayonier,
Inc. v. Wadsworth, 386 F. Supp. 940, 943 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (quoting Marshall v. Hollywood,
Inc., 224 So. 2d 743, 750 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1969)). Since that passage includes §712.02 among
those sections that could extinguish an interest, it appears that the court deems all interests
other than those specifically preserved by §712.03 extinguished.
69. FLA. STAT. §712.03 (1975): "Exceptions to marketability. - Such marketable record
title shall not affect or extinguish the following rights: (1) Estates or interests, easements
and use restrictions disclosed by and defects inherent in the muniments of tile on which
said estate is based beginning with the root of title; provided, however, that a general
reference in any of such muniments to easements, use restrictions or other interests created
prior to the root of title shall not be sufficient to preserve them unless specific identification by reference to book and page of record or by name of record plat be made therein
to a recorded title transaction which imposed, transferred or continued such easement,
use restrictions or other interests; subject, however to the provisions of subsection (5).
"(2) Estates, interests, claims, or charges preserved by the filing of a proper notice in
accordance with the provisions hereof.
"(3) Rights of any person in possession of the lands, so long as such person is in such
possession.
"(4) Estates, interests, claims, or charges arising out of a title transaction which has
been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title.
"(5) Recorded or unrecorded easements or rights, interest or servitude in the nature
of easements, rights-of-way and terminal facilities, including those of a public utility or
of a governmental agency, so long as the same are used and the use of any part thereof
shall except from the operation hereof the right to the entire use thereof. No notice
need be filed in order to preserve the lien of any mortgage or deed of trust or any
supplement thereto encumbering any such recorded or unrecorded easements, or rights, in-
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A careful scrutiny of the language of the statute70 or an examination of
the literature concerning it-' reveals that in seeking to accomplish its stated
objective, the MRTA departs significantly from the time-honored doctrines
of notice and void title. Although section 712.07 provides that nothing in
the law shall be construed "to affect the operation of any statute governing
the effect of the recording or the failure to record any instrument affecting
land" it is virtually impossible to obtain such a construction if each provision in the MRTA is to have meaning. The serious conflicts between the
basic principles of the recording act and the MRTA are the subject of the
rest of this note. The doctrine of void title, formerly unaffected by recordation, will be examined in the root of title context.-2 A discussion of
actual notice under the MRTA and under the recording act follows. 73 Then,
each exception of section 712.03 will be analyzed in terms of its effect on

constructive notice within the recording system.7 4 Finally, recommendations
for legislative amendments and judicial construction are presented.75
The Doctrine of Void Title and The Marketable Record Title Act

In England and in this country, the doctrine that a void title passes no
terest, or servitude in the nature of easements, rights-of-way, and terminal facilities. However, nothing herein shall be construed as preserving to the mortgagee or grantee or any
such mortgage or deed of trust or any supplement thereto any greater rights than the
rights of the mortgagor or grantor.
"(6) Rights of any person in whose name the land is assessed on the county tax rolls for
such period of time as the land is so assessed and which rights are preserved for a period
of 3 years after the land is last assessed in such person's name."
70. There is a notable lack of litigation surrounding marketable title legislation and a
concomitant absence of judicial interpretation. Statutes essentially identical to the Florida
act have been in effect for a combined total of 205 years in 14 states. In that period only
19 reported decisions concerning marketable title legislation have been rendered.
Several theories have been advanced to explain this near void. Some commentators believe the technicalities and complexities of such statutes are overpowering. "For this
reason the Act is little known, little used, and even less understood." Comment, Samachko
v. Hopko: Ohio's Marketable Title Act Comes to the Fore, 23 CLav. ST. L. REv. 337, 337
(1974). Another explanation of the void is that marketable title acts largely duplicate curative acts and statutes of limitation in effect in most states. See, e.g., Boyer & Shapo, Florida's
Marketable Title Act: Prospects and Problems, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv. 103, 104 (1963). Lawyers
prefer these better known and more generally accepted means of clearing old interests and
defects to the uncharted course of marketable title legislation. Thus, despite the widespread
use of the MRTA in the title examination process, it is avoided in title litigation if at
all possible because judicial application of the act is uncertain.
71. See, e.g., Barnett, Marketable Title Acts-Panacea or Pandemonium?, 63 CoaNFJL
L. R&v. 45 (1967). Barnett illustrates the conflict between notice, recording acts, and
marketable title acts in extreme cases. Similar hypotheticals had been dismissed as unrealistic by earlier commentators. See Boyer & Shapo, supra note 70. It should be noted,
however, that the conflict exists in lesser examples as well and that Barnett's hypotheticals
were perhaps chosen to illustrate most clearly the problems that could arise. See note 144
infra for a closer examination of Barnett's hypotheticals.
72. See notes 76-95 infra and accompanying text.
73. See notes 96-108 infraand accompanying text.
74. See notes 99-167 infra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 168-172 infra and accompanying text.
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interest had prevailed without exception until the advent of marketable title
legislation. As previously noted, under the recording act a subsequent bona
fide purchaser received no protection against a void deed in his chain of
title.76 In contrast, marketable title legislation accords the recording of such
void instruments legal effect in some instances. Thus, although the recording
act does not explicitly address void deeds, the MRTA does affect the operation of the recording act by allowing a recorded void deed, not entitled to
recordation, effectively to transfer title to the land when an unrecorded void
deed would not. This is perhaps the most dramatic departure from precedent occasioned by the IRTA. By placing full reliance upon title transactions as they appear of record, the MRTA permits the very evil recording
was designed to prevent, fraudulent conveyances. 77 Any instrument or court
proceeding of record for at least thirty years need only purport 78 to convey
the interest claimed to serve as a root of title. Such language is entirely consistent with the MRTA's objectives of severely limiting the necessity of title
investigation beyond the records79 and facilitating land title transactions.
Florida courts have struggled to reconcile the statutory root of title with
the well-engrained notion that no legal title passes through a void deed. The
leading case in Florida, and in the nation, on the role of void deeds in the
context of marketable title legislation is Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc.80 The
Florida supreme court considered the effect of a void deed, a forgery that
antedated 8 ' the root of title, and held that "[c]laims arising out of transactions,
whether based upon forgeries or not, predating the effective roots of title
are extinguished by operation of the Act unless claimants can come in under
any of the specified exceptions to the Act."8 2 The court properly followed
76. See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
77. The fraud made possible under the MRTA is of a different type from that avoided
by the recording act. Under recording acts subsequent purchasers are protected from
sales by fraudulent vendors without title. Under the MRTA the legal owner may be
fraudulently divested of title to the land.
78. The Florida supreme court defines "purport" as meaning "[to] profess outwardly;
[to] have the often specious appearance of being." ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Wadsworth, 346
So. 2d 1004, 1010 (Fla. 1977) (quoting WNEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1847 (3d
ed. 1961)).
79. One should not need to investigate beyond the records with respect to interests
that predate the root of title; however, an extraneous investigation is prudent if there is
a possibility that an unrecorded easement remains partially in use. Contrary to the MRTA's
pronouncement that it permits one to rely on a record title, investigation extraneous to

the records is necessary as to postroot matters in any event, and possibly as to the root
itself. See text accompanying note 153 infra.

80. 236 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1970). See generally Comment, Marketable Record Title Acts:
Wild, Forged, and Void Deeds as Roots of Title, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 669 (1970).
81. Marshall will be examined later in the context of whether void deeds as or subsequent to the root of title provide constructive notice of their void nature. See text accompanying note 114 infra. Note, however, that the Marshall case involved a preroot forgery.
See note 82 infra.
82. 236 So. 2d at 117. Marshall died in 1923 while president and principal stockholder
in the Atlantic Beach Company, which owned the property in question. Shortly thereafter,
Marshall's widow, without knowledge of her deceased husband's interest in the company,
left Florida. In February 1924 Frank M. Terry fraudulently executed and recorded a deed
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the literal language of the statute s and allowed a deed that purported to
convey legal title to the land to serve as a root of title even though the
grantor in that instrument received his interest through a void deed. Having
established the root of title as a reference point in time, 4 all interests
arising prior to that date and not specifically preserved were extinguished.
Thus, as the interests of those contesting the claimant's title outdated the
root of title they were extinguished, and the court found legal title vested
in the claimant.8 5 Except for the operation of the MRTA, however, neither
the claimant nor his predecessors in title back to the date of the forgery

would ever have held legal title to the land because title had never passed
from the owner who was purportedly divested by the forgery. Presumably,
the Marshall court would have reached the same result if the void deed predating the root of title had been void for want of capacity, for execution in
contravention of constitutionally protected homestead interests, or for lack
of delivery8 6 A wild deed predating the root of title should have had a like
effect.
Historically, neither a void deed nor a deed once removed from a void or

wild deed could convey title.87 A void or wild deed that purports to convey

in the name of Atlantic Beach Company to himself, purportedly conveying the land involved. Terry had no interest in the corporation or authorization to vote its stock. On
April 11, 1924, a deed from Terry to Hollywood Realty Company was recorded and on
August 22, 1924, a deed from Hollywood Realty to Homeseekers Realty Company was
placed on record. In 1929 Highway Construction Company obtained a judgment against
Homeseekers and in 1930 received title to the property through a sheriff's sale. That deed
was recorded on December 50, 1930. One year later Highway Construction conveyed to
Hollywood Realty, which immediately recorded the deed. That deed was the asserted
root of title challenged by the brother of Marshall when suit was brought in 1967.
83. The Florida Bar submitted amicus curiae briefs in Marshall, as the case represented
the first judicial construction of the act. The construction urged by the Bar, that the
language of the statute be applied literally and that "purport" be given its everyday meaning, was followed by the court.
84. Interests arising out of transactions of record for more than thirty years are not
automatically extinguished by age. Rather, a root of title must be established, and the
interests that antedate it are extinguished. The root must be at least thirty years old but
may be much older.
85. It is important to follow the progressive reasoning of the court. First a valid root
of title was established. All interests predating the root were then extinguished. Thus the
holder of legal title divested by a forgery prior to the root no longer had a claim to present.
As a result, the claimant had a marketable record title and legal title. The court did not
say the forged deed or any subsequent deeds conveyed legal title. Rather, they found
the true owner's interest extinguished, and, as no challenge to current title could be made,
the current title was valid. See Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 224 So. 2d 743, 752 (Fla. 4th
D.CA. 1969).
86. The lower appellate court placed void deeds executed in violation of homestead
provisions in the same class as forged deeds. Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 224 So. 2d 743,
750 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1969). But see Reid v. Bradshaw, 302 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975),
in which the court distinguished a forged void deed from a void deed that attempted
to convey constitutionally protected homestead interests. Such a distinction lacks solid
precedent.
87. The plaintiff in Marshall argued that since the forgery conveyed nothing, all
subsequent deeds were also void and conveyed nothing. The court found the root "pur-
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the estate claimed should serve equally well as the root of title unless the
interests of the person purportedly divested by forgery or otherwise are
preserved from extinguishment under section 712.03.sa Florida's Second
District Court of Appeal in Wilson v. Kelley89 affirmatively answered the
question of whether a wild deed could serve as a root of title. 90 The court
stated:
The Act, as a marketable title act, is not concerned with the quality
of the title conveyed by the root of title so long as the root purports to
convey the estate claimed. This can be so even though a deed is not
part of the chain of title emanating from the sovereign and is therefore often called an "interloping" or "wild" deed.9 1
Notably, however, recent Ohio 92 and Oklahoma 9 cases dealing with
marketable title legislation reached a contrary result. In both instances, the
courts emphasized that "a grantor cannot pass to his grantee better title
than he himself has." 94 Thus, in those states, a remote grantee cannot claim
a marketable record title unless his root of title constitutes part of a chain
emanating from the sovereign. Such disregard of the statutory mandate
that a root of title need only purport to convey the interest claimed seriously
restricts the effectiveness of the legislation. It becomes necessary to show a
complete record chain of title to the sovereign in order to ascertain the
validity of the root, and a void title transaction recorded anywhere in that
entire chain would render all subsequent instruments incapable of transferring legal title despite their regular appearance. Although such a construction substantially defeats the legislative objective of simplifying title
examinations by allowing persons to rely on a record title consisting of the
root of title and subsequent instruments, it does satisfy the legislative directive that the MRTA shall not affect the operation of the recording act. 95
ported to convey title and the void character of the deed was not preserved by §712.03.
Thus, the fact that the deed was void or could not convey legal title was irrelevant.
88. To illustrate, if X were the grantee in a deed recorded in 1920, but a forged deed
was recorded in 1925 in which X allegedly conveyed to A, in 1955 X's interest would be
extinguished since his interest arose out of the 1920 deed, prior to the root of title. But
see notes 106-135 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of forgeries subsequent
to the root of title, see note 135 infra.
89. 226 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969).
90. While the Wilson court did not deem any of the exceptions in §712.03 applicable
to a wild deed, such exceptions have been used to prevent void deeds from serving as roots
of title. See text accompanying notes 106-135 infra.
91. 226 So. 2d at 127. This message was cited with approval by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 224 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1969).
92. Reaquarth Co. v. State, 38 Ohio St. 2d 77, 310 N.E.2d 581 (1974).
93. Allen v. Farmer's Union Coop. Royalty Co., 538 P.2d 204, (Okla. 1975).
94. Reaquarth Co. v. State, 38 Ohio St. 2d 77, 84, 310 N.E.2d 581, 586 (1974).
95. Arguably, the doctrine of void title remains in effect under the MRTA as to the
root of title and subsequent instruments if the language of §712.03(1) regarding "defects
inherent in the muniments of title" is construed to include void instruments even when
their void quality is not apparent from the record. The Florida supreme court recently
emphasized, however, that only defects apparent on the face of recorded instruments axe
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Actual Notice and the Marketable Record Title Act

At common law and under the recording acts, a purchaser with actual
knowledge of claims or interests outstanding against the land purchased
took title subject to those interests and was estopped from denying their
existence.9 6 For example, a purchaser fully aware of a use restriction concerning his property was bound thereby even though the restriction was not in
his record chain of title and his deed proclaimed the land to be free of
restrictions. Such a result does not always obtain under the MRTA. To read
section 712.04 literally, any interest or restriction, recorded or unrecorded,
which antedates the root of title and is not preserved under section 712.03 is
extinguished. Thus, despite actual knowledge, a purchaser takes title to the
property free and clear of such restrictions.
Although the literal result may well be desirable in many instances and
can be justified by the ease with which the restriction could have been preserved,97 other examples reveal that such a provision may be subject to
abuse. Consider a grantee, A, who accepts title subject to a use restriction,
possibility of reverter, or similar interest. The next day A conveys, free of all
restrictions and interests, to his wife, W, or to a strawman, S, who reconveys
to LA. After thirty years, the A to W or 'A to S deed would be a valid root
of title and all restrictions extinguished, perhaps even as to A himself.9s While
such a procedure is not likely to become popular with respect to individual
residential lots because of the minimum thirty-year waiting period involved,
the ability affirmatively to eliminate restrictions or interests may render the
wait worthwhile for developers or investors.
Although constructive notice was reshaped by the recording system, the
MRTA is the first attempt to limit actual notice. Not only does extinguishment of interests that predate the root of title prevent implied notice of
those interests from binding future purchasers, but it may free those with
actual notice of recorded or unrecorded interests from the estoppel formerly
imposed by that knowledge.
ConstructiveNotice and the Marketable Record Title Act

The departures from the equitable doctrine of constructive notice that
accompanied the development of the recording system were outlined above 99
included within the scope of §712.03(1). See ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Wadsworth, 346 So. 2d
1004, 1011 (Fla. 1977). See text accompanying notes 109-112 infra.
96. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
97. One need only file a notice in compliance with FLA. STAT. §§712.05-.06 (1975) to
preserve any interests or claim he might have. Yet the grantor is not likely to fie notice
to preserve the restriction as long as his grantee is still the record owner.
98. Contractual remedies might exist against A, but these would only be enforceable
by A's grantor in the original deed. The intervening conveyance might eliminate the contractual privity, but a court exercising equitable powers could look to the realities of the
transaction. In any event, the importance of negative reciprocal easements and restrictions
implied by the courts from the character of neighborhoods may well increase.
99. See notes 18-25 supra and accompanying text.
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Marketable title legislation further distorts the doctrine, almost beyond
recognition. 1 The MRTA binds one neither to notice of all instruments
in his record chain of title nor to all interests discoverable in a "reasonable
search" of title.'101 Any interest, the existence of which depends upon a title
transaction or event predating the root of title, is extinguished unless otherwise specifically preserved. And an extinguished interest, despite its proper
recordation and indexation, is not binding on future purchasers. If, as one
commentator contends, the Florida act extinguishes all interests not specifically
preserved under section 712.03102 rather than just those dependent on preroot transactions or events, the enumerated exceptions themselves now determine the bounds of constructive notice. 03 In light of section 712.04 such a
construction of the act is subject to dispute. 10 4 Nevertheless, the exceptions
include the vast majority of interests that can bind purchasers to constructive
notice of their existence.

10 5

ExCEPTIONS TO MARKETABILITY

InterestsDisclosed by and Defects Inherent in the Muniments of Title
The first of the exceptions, section 712.03(1), preserves estates, interests,
easements, and use restrictions disclosed by and defects inherent in the muniments of title on which said estate is based, beginning with the root of title.
The subsection was intended to preserve easements, restrictions, and interests
created prior to the root of title but specifically referred to in the root or
subsequent instruments in the record chain. 1 6 It is probable that only interests
and defects apparent on the face of such instruments were intended to be
preserved. 0 7 Such an interpretation is consistent with the doctrine of con100. Perhaps the doctrine has been abrogated altogether. If §712.03 enumerates all
exceptions to marketability and a purchaser is subject only to those interests, constructive
notice as implied from the type of title search one should make is redundant. Since the
recording act so closely reflects the doctrine of constructive notice, the marketable title
act and the recording act can only be reconciled if constructive notice remains a part of
the scheme.
101. If the Florida MRTA permits the extinguishment of easements predating the
root of title and no longer observably in use and the extinguishment of interests of the
state of Florida and the United States, reasonable search could be redefined to include
only those recorded instruments that postdate the root of title. A trade-off between preroot matters in the record chain of title and postroot matters of record not in the chain
of title would be effectuated. The exceptions to the Florida MRTA prevent such a step,
however.
102. Barnett, supra note 71, at 62 n.48.
103. Since extinguished interests are a nullity they resemble void transactions of
record and give no notice. If all interests except those preserved by §712.03 are extinguished,
only exceptions to the statute can be notice to future purchasers.
104. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
105. See text accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
106.

L. StMas & C. TAYLOR,

rupranote

52, at 12, 101-06.

107. The statute should only preserve interests in the preroot chain that are specifically
referred to in later instruments. If the title examination burden imposed by a general
reference was deemed too great, certainly the burden imposed by defects not apparent
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structive notice under the recording act. Thus a defective acknowledgment
or a specific reference to a use restriction would be within the scope of this
exception. The interests of a record owner divested by a forgery should not
be protected by this section, however, because the defect cannot be ascertained
from the record.108
The Florida supreme court in ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Wadsworth 0 9
recently interpreted section 712.03(1). In 1935 L. E. Wadsworth, Sr. died,
possessed of homestead property and survived by his widow and four minor
children. The statute then governing the descent of homestead provided that
the surviving spouse would receive a life estate in the homestead property
subject to vested remainders in any children. In 1937 Mrs. Wadsworth
executed a deed conveying the entire fee simple to herself and her son
Lewis as tenants in common. In 1942 Mrs. Wadsworth and Lewis Wadsworth
conveyed the property to Rayonier, which now claims a marketable record
title free and clear of the children's vested remainder since that interest
arose prior to the 1937 root of title. The children argued that section
712.03(1) preserved their interests because the 1937 deed had two inherent
defects: (1) it conveyed their remainder interests, and (2) it conveyed
property from Mrs. Wadsworth to herself. The supreme court rejected both
arguments because these were not defects in constitution but rather defects
in transmission."0 The court continued by noting "[t]he face of the deed
does not reflect the defect of a conveyance from Lotta to herself,""' and
"[s]ince there is nothing on the face of the deed, in its make up or construction, to indicate that it conveys the children's remainder interests, those
interests are not saved from extinguishment by subsection (1) of section 712.03,
Florida Statutes.""12 Clearly the court deemed subsection (1) to preserve
only interests apparent from the face of recorded instruments.
from the record at all is unacceptable. The act was designed to allow the title examiner
to rely on those instruments of record that comprise the unbroken chain of title at least
thirty years long. A specific reference within such a chain to an outstanding interest or
restriction tells the examiner exactly which interest is excepted or at least where it can
be found. Similarly, a defect apparent on the face of an instrument in the chain puts
the examiner on notice of possible outstanding interests. To discover defects such as
forgeries which are not discernable from the record but which are inherent in such chain,

the examiner would be forced to go beyond the records, and a burden far greater than
that of a general reference would be imposed.
108. If one adopts the construction of §712.02 espoused by Professor Barnett, the
interests of one purportedly divested by a void deed must be protected under this or some
other exception if they are to be preserved. Barnett, supra note 71, at 62-63 n.48. See also
text accompanying notes 67-68 supra. If, in contrast, §712.04 is deemed controlling and
only preroot matters are extinguished, then only those interests arising out of preroot trans-

actions are extinguished.
109. 346 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1977).
110. Id. at 1011. The court said that the phrasing of the children's argument reflected
a lack of understanding of the statute. Then, quoting from Marshall, the court continued:
"The terms 'defects inherent in the muniments of title' do not refer to defects or failures
in the transmission of title, as the plaintiff's argument suggests, but refer to defects in the
makeup or constitution of the deed or other muniments of title on which such transmission
depends." Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Nevertheless, Florida courts have in the past interpreted this exception
to include defects such as forgeries. 113 Marshall, discussed previously in relation to the effect of void deeds antedating the root of title, 114 is at least
partially responsible for this result. The opinion of the Fourth District Court
of Appeal, 15 adopted by the Florida supreme court, 1 6 discussed void deeds
constituting or subsequent to the root of title, as well as void deeds prior
to the root."-7 In the opinion, the court accepted and incorporated the sound

view of Professor Barnett:
[I]f the root of title is itself a forged deed, the act will not extinguish
the interest of the person whose name appears as the grantor therein,
even though his interest "depends upon [a] . . . transaction . . . that

occurred prior to the effective date of the root of title and is otherwise
subject to extinguishment. .

.

. Similarly, the act will not eliminate

the problem of forgeries in any link subsequent to the root of title,
although it will extinguish the right of owners whose names were
forged to links in the chain prior to the root.""
The quoted passage was taken from a section of Barnett's article explaining
defects inherent in the muniments of the record chain of title. He maintains
that a void deed that is a root of title or that is in the chain of title subsequent to the root is such a defect and that the interests of the party divested
by the void instrument are thus preserved." 9
Consistent with Barnett's reasoning, and the Marshall court's adoption of
that reasoning, Florida courts have not recognized a void deed as a root of
title. 20 In Reid v. Bradshaw,"1 the First District Court of Appeal of Florida
113. E.g., Reid v. Bradshaw, 302 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975); Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 224 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1969).
114. See notes 80-86 supra and accompanying text.
115. Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 224 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1969).
116. 236 So. 2d at 118. "The arguments which we have enumerated have been thoroughly
explored and correctly analyzed by Judge Reed in a lucid and cogent opinion affirming
the Circuit Court dismissal which he prepared for the District Court below. There is little
we could add to his opinion .... Id.
117. The Marshall opinion is often cited for the proposition that void deeds may be
good roots of title on the basis of the following language: "mhe act may be applied to
validate a record title even though it may be based on a void deed." 224 So. 2d at 750.
See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 55, at 85. The quote is misleading, however, as "based on"
must be read in the context of the first half of the sentence here omitted. The sentence
is limited to the circumstances before the court in 'Marshall, which involved a void deed
prior to the deed that constituted the root of title.
118. 224 So. 2d at 751-52.
119. Therefore, since the interest of the one purportedly divested by a forgery is
preserved as a defect inherent in the root of title, that interest can be asserted against
the root of title and subsequent instruments, and a marketable record title cannot be
shown. Compare this reasoning with that in note 85 supra.
120. Consider Wernle v. Bellemead Dev. Corp., 308 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1975), in which the
supreme court found that no title transaction with sufficient status or for sufficient duration to serve as a root of title had been asserted. Id. at 102. The Murphy Act of 1937, 1937
Fla. Laws, ch. 18296, which in 1939 automatically converted to fee simple title in the
state all property more than four years delinquent in the payment of taxes, was asserted
to be a root of title within the scope of the MRTA. In 1937, however, the legislature had
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was faced with the question "as to whether Chapter 712 can breathe life
into a chain of title which emanated from a deed void because of violation
of a constitutional provision."' - A 1929 deed from Joseph Noe, as sole
grantor, to his wife was asserted as the root of title. The wife's signature
appeared on the instrument but recitations indicated that her signature was
not to complete the conveyance to her but to convey the land to her son. At
the time of execution, Noe, his wife, and his children were residing on this
property as their homestead. The Florida Constitution at that time required
the signatures of both spouses to alienate homestead property. 23 Thus, the
asserted root of title was void for want of proper execution in compliance
with the constitution. After quoting the same passage from Barnett, the
Reid court held that a conveyance of homestead property in contravention
of the constitution was a defect inherent in the root of title preserved by
section 712.03(1)124 and, as a result, that the conveyance could not serve
as a good root of title. The appellate court expressed great concern that its
holding could not be reconciled with Marshall. Quite to the contrary, the
Marshall court's allowance of a void deed in the chain of title prior to the
root of title is entirely consistent with the district court's disallowance of a
void deed as the root of title itself if one adopts the position espoused by
Barnett and incorporated into both opinions. 25 The first district's extended
justifications for its decision, distinguishing "normal" void deeds such as
forgeries from those void for execution in contravention of the constitution,
was wholly unnecessary.22 6 The court admitted that had a deed subsequent
to the void deed been asserted as the root of title a marketable record title,
free of any homestead interests, would have vested in the plaintiffs. This is
2
precisely the holding in Marshall.1
passed a special act authorizing Volusia County to cancel tax certificates covering lands of
owners who agreed to convey to the state property equal in value to the taxes past due.
Cancellation of tax certificates covering the land in dispute was ordered in accordance
with special act but never took place. Thus, the court reasoned, the title assumed by
the state in 1989 and the conveyance out of the state by Murphy deed in 1941 to the
defendant were void. The court may have opined that the Murphy Act was not a title

transaction within the terms of the MRTA, although this was not explicitly stated. If so,
neither it nor the 29-year-old Murphy deed could serve as a root of title. Nevertheless,

status may as readily be construed to mean that the void nature of the state's acquisition
of title in 1939 was that which prevented it from serving as a root of title. Id. See Comment,
Florida'sCurative Statute of Limitations and the Void Tax Deed: Kill or Cure, 28 U. FA.
L. R v. 265 (1975).
121. 802 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975).
122. Id. at 184.
123. FLA. CONSr. art. X, §1 (1885).
124. 802 So. 2d'at 184.
125. The Reid court's compulsion to distinguish the cases could be read to imply
that had the deed in question in Reid been a forgery, the court would have reached a

contrary result.
126. Although only briefly mentioned by the court, it should be noted that the homestead interest did not vest until after the effective date of the root of title. Thus, under
one view, §712.04 would not extinguish the interest since it arose out of the father's
death, an event subsequent to the root of title. 802 So. 2d at 182.
127. Id. at 188.
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The Reid holding must be limited to its facts, however. In ITT Rayonier
the supreme court distinguished Reid, explaining that the deed from Noe
to his wife was defective on its face because the recital strongly indicated
homestead

property and the wife's signature was clearly missing. 1 28 Ap-

parently, if there had been no indications of homestead property, the absence
of Mrs. Noe's signature would not have been a defect evident from the face
of the deed. Thus the defect in the 1929 conveyance, execution in violation
of the constitution, rendering the instrument void, would not be preserved
and such 129a conveyance could serve as a root of title extinguishing homestead
interests.

The Reid opinion was clearly more expansive than the supreme court
now acknowledges. Judge Johnson, speaking for the court, stated that the
MRTA "does not change the long standing rule of law that no statute can
breathe life into an instrument made and executed in contravention of
constitutional inhibition."130 It was the inherently void nature of the deed

that offended the court. The court paid little attention to whether the improper execution was apparent from the face of the deed. Yet the latter
factor, and not the former one, determines the applicability of section 712.03(1)
and, as a result, the viability of the instrument.
A construction of section 712.03(1) that preserves any defect in the root of
title and subsequent muniments of title, whether evident on the face of such
instruments or not, strains the requirement that a root need only "purport"
to convey the interest claimed. Most defects that would distinguish a deed
that actually conveyed legal title to property from one that only purportedly
conveyed it would be preserved. 131 However, an exact characterization of the
nature of the defect preserved is illusive. Lack of legal title cannot be that
which is preserved because a void deed prior to the root would then have
the same effect as a void deed as the root of title.13 2 Perhaps the impropriety
of the transaction asserted as the root of title is the defect preserved. But, is

128. 346 So. 2d at 1011.
129. If marketability is only subject to the exceptions enumerated in §712.03 and subsection (1) only preserves defects on the face of recorded instruments, the interests of one
divested by a void deed are left unprotected unless they appear as defects on the face of
recorded instruments. Defects such as forgery and legal incapacity would not qualify under
subsection (1) and thus would not be exceptions to marketability. While at first glance
this result appears highly undesirable, it must be remembered that if the original owner
were in possession his interest would be preserved. FLA. STAT. §712.03(3) (1975). Similarly,
if within three years he noticed that assessment of taxes in his name had ceased and
pursued the matter promptly, his interest would be safe. FLA. STAT. §712.03(6) (1975). These
other safeguards and the benefits of greater record reliability must be balanced against
the need to deter fraud and prevent a legal owner from wrongfully being stripped of
his title to the property.
130. 302 So. 2d at 183.
131. The exception to this general rule is illustrated by Marshall. The Toot of title
there only "purported" to convey title while in reality no title had passed to the grantor.
Yet in Marshall the absence of legal title in the grantor was not deemed a defect preserved
by subsection (1). 263 So. 2d at 120.
132. But see note 95 supra.
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it not then anomalous that a wild deed can serve as a valid root of title,

83
particularly if the grantor therein creates the wild chain? 3
If subsection (1) of section 712.03 is limited to preserving defects evident
from the face of instruments in the record chain of title beginning with the
root, it is entirely compatible with the doctrine of constructive notice implied
from the records. If, however, subsection (1) is interpreted to include defects
such as forgeries and conveyances of homestead property, neither of which
are apparent from the records, a new defect, the impropriety of a particular
transaction, has replaced the old void title doctrine.34 Whether denominated
constructive notice or not, the purchaser takes title subject to such defects,

thus rendering an investigation behind the instruments in the record chain
prudent.13 5 It is readily apparent that the purpose of the MRTA - simplifying title transactions by promoting record reliance - is frustrated by each requirement of investigation extraneous to the records. The preserving exception of section 712.03(1) should be restricted to those interests and defects
apparent on the face of the recorded instruments which comprise the
claimant's chain of title beginning with the root. Thus, without departing

from the doctrine of notice, reliance upon the records is promoted and title
examination is simplified.
Interests Preserved by the Filingof ProperNotice
The second exception to marketability enumerated in section 712.03 preserves all estates, interests, claims, or charges preserved by the filing of
133. The inconsistency of the Barnett approach and that previously followed by the
Florida courts is recognized in Hicks, supra note 55, at 68. The author criticizes an interpretation that would preserve defects in constitution, such as forgeries, but not defects in
transmission, such as wild deeds. Id. at 93. Note, however, that while repeating this same
distinction, the Florida supreme court in ITT Rayonier considered defects in constitution
to be only those defects apparent on the face of recorded instruments.
134. It could be contended that the doctrine still exists, but only as to the root and
subsequent instruments. See note 95 supra.
135. While the exceptions enumerated in §712.03(1) are necessary to preserve the
interests of one purportedly divested by the root of title itself, the interests of those divested
by void transactions subsequent to the root might not be extinguished anyway. If precedence
is given to §712.04, see text accompanying note 65 supra, only those interests dependent
on preroot transactions or events are extinguished. Those interests divested by void transactions subsequent to the root likely depend only upon the root itself or postroot transactions. Thus a preserving exception is unnecessary for those interests. But since such
interests are not extinguished, the burden of investigation explained above applies equally
to these postroot transactions.
136. The extent to which title examination is simplified depends upon whether the
enumerated exceptions in §712.03 are exclusive or nonexclusive in nature. See notes 68-72
supra and accompanying text. If marketability is subject to only those exceptions, and
defects not apparent from the face of the records are excluded from those exceptions,
then title examination is greatly simplified. But the interests of one divested of title
through a void transaction will be jeopardized by that approach. In contrast, if market-

ability is subject to all interests not extinguished by §712.04, title examination is not greatly
affected by the interpretation of this exception. Only the interests of one divested by the
root itself would be extinguished, and as subsequent interests remain they must be investigated.
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proper notice.137 Although this subsection has yet to be judicially construed,
it necessarily departs from the concept that an index-guided reasonable
search defines the limits of constructive notice. If the notices were recorded
and indexed so as always to appear in the record chain of title the conflict
would not exist. But section 712.06 only requires the claimant to provide the
name and address of an owner 13 8 or the name and address of the person in
whose name property taxes were last assessed.13 9 The notice is then recorded
and indexed as though the purported owner were the grantor and the
claimant the grantee in a deed. 140 If the purported owner is in fact the record
owner on the date the notice is filed, a subsequent purchaser would find the
notice in a reasonable search of his title. If the purported owner is not the
record owner at that time, however, a reasonable search through the record
chain of title will not reveal the notice. That fact notwithstanding, subsequent purchasers are held to notice of such claims. The situation is analogous
to the notice of improperly indexed deeds, which have been found binding
on subsequent purchasers. 141 The reasonable search of title acknowledged by
the judiciary becomes increasingly less realistic as the number of binding
interests not disclosed by such a search grows. 42 And the doctrine of constructive notice moves farther away from its original justification that one
should not be allowed to benefit from his failure to make a reasonable title
examination. 1 4 3 Even though notices of claim are recorded and thus within
the literal language of the recording act, a "wild" notice should no more
bind a future purchaser than a "wild" deed. Thus the accepted operation of
the recording act must give way to this subsection, or vice versa.
Recorded Interests Subsequent to the Root of Title
Subsection (4) of section 712.03 presents exactly the same conflict as subsection (2). All estates, interests, claims, or charges arising out of title transactions recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title are pre137. See note 69 supra for the text of this subsection.
138. The name of the current record owner is not required.
139. FLA. STAT. §712.06 (1975): "Contents of notice; recording and indexing. -(1) To
be effective, the notice above referred to shall contain: . . . (b) The name and post-office
address of an owner, or the name and post-office address of the person in whose name
said property is assessed on the last completed tax assessment roll of the county at the
time of filing, who, for the purpose of such notice, shall be deemed to be an owner. ...
(2) Such notice shall be filed with the clerk of the circuit court of the county or counties
where the land described therein is situated, together with a true copy thereof. The clerk
shall enter, record and index said notice in the same manner that deeds are entered,
recorded and indexed, as though the claimant were the grantee in the deed and the purported owner were the grantor in a deed.
140. Id.
141. See Cawthon v. Stearns Culver Lumber Co., 60 Fla. 313, 53 So. 738 (1910).
142. The reliability of the record itself is not impaired by this exception as it would
be if defects not apparent on the face of recorded instruments were deemed to give notice
to subsequent purchasers. Rather, the approved method of search is undermined by a
further exception to its reliability.
143. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
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served.1 44 While in complete accord with the language of the recording
act - that is, that recordation of any instrument entitled to record gives subsequent purchasers notice of that instrument - this section further disables
judicially defined reasonable search based on grantor-grantee indexes by preserving interests arising out of recorded transactions not in the claimant's
asserted record chain of title. 45 The Oklahoma supreme court recently
illustrated the application of this subsection in Allen v. Farmer's Union Cooperative Realty Corp. 46 The claimant asserted a marketable record title to
a one-sixteenth interest in oil, gas, coal, iron, and other mineral rights under
144. See note 69 supra for the text of §712.03(4). The crucial question posed by this
exception, and §712.03(2) and §712.03(6), is whether the preservation of one's rights includes all prior instruments on which those rights are based. See note 158 infra and
accompanying text. Barnett offered several hypotheticals to illustrate this problem, but
his conclusions are subject to dispute.
"Suppose that in 1920 0 conveys Blackacre to A who records that year. In 1921 0 conveys to X, who records immediately." Barnett, supra note 71, at 54. In 1941 A conveyed
to B. In determining whether this transaction will prevent extinguishment of the A to B
chain in favor of X, Barnett assumed that "B's interest depends on a transaction that
occurred prior to the effective date of X's root, i.e., on the 1920 conveyance from 0 to A."
Id. at 55. Thus, B's interest would be extinguished by §712.04 unless excepted from its
operation. If the phrase "depends on" is construed to require B to show the passage of an
actual interest into himself and thus the validity of the 1920 conveyance, are not all
instruments in the record chain of that interest back to the sovereign equality vital to the
validity of B's interest? An interpretation of "depends on" that is more consistent with the
MRTA's emphasis on instruments that purport to create and purport to divest is one that
holds an interest dependent upon only that instrument which purports to create it. Therefore B's interest depends on the deed from A to B alone and is not extinguished by §712.04.
If the MRTA is read to extinguish all interests not preserved by §712.03, however, B's
interest must be protected by some exception in that section. Barnett examined the
applicability of subsection (4). His concern was whether B's interest arose out of the
1920 deed or the 1941 deed. Recognizing the accepted position which would find the interest
arose out of the 1941 deed, he criticized the unreasonable burden thus placed upon title
examiners using grantor-grantee indexes. Id. at 55-56. Since B, as a subsequent bona fide
purchaser in 1941, and couldn't find X's interest in a reasonable title search, the preservation of B's interest gives B a valid title to the land.
If the A to B conveyance occurred after 1961, the problem is more complex. Barnett
maintained that "X would prevail over both A and B, because their interests depend on a
transaction

-

the 1920 deed from 0

to A-

that occurred before . . . the effective date

of X's root. Since A's interest would be extinguished in [1961], it could not be preserved
under section [712.03(4)] by the recording of the ... deed from WAto B." Id. at 57. If B's
deed does not depend on the 1920 conveyance but rather on the postroot deed, however,
then B's interest would not be extinguished. ,B's interest would be preserved if it were
viewed as arising out of the post-1961 deed. In either event the problem is the viability of
that interest in a quiet title suit brought by X. If *A's interest were extinguished in 1961,
then B received only a wild deed despite having made a reasonable record search of title.
If the interests preserved are to be meaningful, however perhaps those instruments through
which B now claims, essential to B's claim of title, are also preserved. If that is the case,
no extinguishment is absolute.
145. If the interest arose out of a recorded transaction in the record chain of title
it would be preserved as an interest disclosed by the muniments of title under subsection
(1). If subsection (4) is to have any independent effect, it must apply to transactions not
in the record chain of title unless it was intended merely to clarify subsection (1).
146. 538 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1975).
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a 1938 root of title. The original severance of the mineral and surface estates
in 1921, however, had conveyed only an undivided one-half interest in oil
and gas to the claimant's predecessors in title. Furthermore, two recent title
transactions involving the surface estate specifically referred to the one-half
interest in oil and gas reserved and to the conveyance effecting the severance.
The Oklahoma court considered the surface and mineral estates as distinct
chains of title, thus rendering the exception for interests disclosed by the
muniments of the record chain inapplicable. 147 Nevertheless, the references
were deemed to constitute interests arising out of title transactions recorded
subsequent to the root oF title, and the claimant's marketable record title
was held subject to those interests. 148
Subsection (4), therefore, preserves "wild" instruments of record, those
not in the claimant's chain of title. Traditionally, however, the recording act
has been interpreted to exclude such wild instruments from those which give
future purchasers notice of their existence. And a future purchaser without
notice is protected against prior "unrecorded" interests. Thus a subsequent
bona fide purchaser took free and clear of any such "wild" instruments. The
MRTA provides, however, that such interests are "exceptions to marketability."'1 91 If this subsection is to be effective at all, and not mooted by the
operation of the recording act, then it must be deemed to bind subsequent
purchasers to notice of "wild" recorded instruments. Such a construction
takes a purchaser out from under the protection of the recording act as he
is no longer "without notice." Therefore the wild instruments remain as
exceptions to marketability, unaffected by the operation of section 695.01
of Florida Statutes, thereby changing the accepted operation of the recording
act.
It appears then that subsequent purchasers now take subject to both wild
notices and wild instruments of record, yet a reasonable index-guided search
of title reveals neither. Today, however, title examinations in Florida are
made almost exclusively with the aid of abstracts, and therefore in nearly
every instance that a title examination is actually made, wild instruments
as well as those in the record chain are presented to the examiner. The MRTA
thus holds purchasers to notice of only that which the usual title examination
would reveal. The principle strongly resembles the early English doctrine
of constructive notice. A judicial recognition that the elements of a reasonable investigation of title have changed is in order. 50 If a reasonable search
were deemed to include an abstract, wild instruments and notices would be

147.

Id. at 209.

148.

Id.

MODEL MARKETABLE Raco,
Trrm Aar §2. See also FLA. STAT. §712.03 (1975). See
note 69 supra.
150. The major obstacle delaying the adoption of abstracts as necessary elements in
a reasonable search is that abstracts are privately prepared and must be purchased, whereas

149.

the public records facilitate a title search free of charge. If the legislature recognized that
the MRTA virtually necessitated the use of abstracts, then the choice has already been
made. The courts need only to recognize that choice, not to weigh the respective ad-

vantages on either side and make an independent determination.
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revealed in such a search and the MRTA and the recording act could be
reconciled in regard to these exceptions.
Recorded and Unrecorded Easements Any Part of Which Are in Use
Section 712.03(5), which preserves recorded or unrecorded easements and
rights of way provided any part of the same is in use,151 further vitiates the
doctrine of reasonable search. The Model Marketable Title Act would have
preserved only those easements which are dearly observable. 15 2 The Model
Act thus would have imposed a burden of investigation similar to that
traditionally imposed by the possession of one not the record owner.1 53 But the
Florida act requires neither the easement's visible use nor its recordation. An
unrecorded observable easement creates no conceptual problems, since its
visible use, like possession, would put one on inquiry as to the interests of
the user. But dassifying an unrecorded easement as an exception to marketability is unsound when the use is not apparent to an observer. Such an exception does not facilitate reliance on recorded title transactions as the easement
preserved is itself unrecorded; nor does this exception comport with constructive notice implied by possession as no such possession is observable.
An unrecorded and unobservable easement would be invalid against a
subsequent bona fide purchaser under previous interpretations of the recording act. Even one who obtained an abstract would not be informed of unrecorded and unobservable interests and would be protected by the recording act. Thus, if the language of subsection (5) is to have any meaning, the
recording act must be found not to apply. Nevertheless, to imply notice of an
interest neither in the record chain of title nor discoverable in a reasonable

investigation of the premises is to extend the doctrine of constructive notice
beyond all practical limits and to impose an entirely new risk on subsequent
purchasers.
The more commonly noted effect of section 712.03(5) is that it necessitates
a full examination of title back to the sovereign." The subsection preserves
any recorded easement at least partially in use regardless of its age, and therefore requires a complete title search to determine if any recorded easements
exist. If the Model Act's requirement that the easement be observably in use
had been followed, the preservation of the interest would be-justified on the
grounds of constructive notice implied from possession. Yet, notwithstanding
this exception's serious restraint on the success of the MRTA in simplifying
title examination, it is conceptually consistent with the constructive notice
implied under the recording system. Currently, of those instruments in one's
record chain of title which predate the root, only easements in use, rather
than all interests, are binding on subsequent purchasers.
151. See note 69 supra for the full text of this subsection.
152. MODEL M
rABLE TrrLE Acr §6: "This act shall not be applied to bar or
extinguish any easement or interest in the nature of an easement, the existence of which
is dearly observable by physical evidence of its use."
153. See note 21 supra.

154. See, e.g., BoYE & SHAL'Po, supra note 70, at 103.
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If the legislative purpose of simplifying title transactions warrants legislation as comprehensive as the MRTA it should not be obstructed and substantially defeated by an exception such as that found in section 712.03(5).
The position adopted in the Model Act should replace that taken by subsection (5). If such an amendment is impractical in this state, however, the
exception should at the very least be restricted to recorded or observable easements, eliminating the unrecorded unobservable easement from its scope. This
latter amendment would facilitate compatible construction of the recording
act and the MRTA without imposing new title risks on subsequent purchasers.
Rights of Persons in Possession
1 55
The rights of persons in possession so long as they remain in possession
are preserved by section 712.03(3). 196 This exception is in complete conformance with the historical doctrine binding subsequent purchasers to constructive notice of a possessor's interests. The effect of this exception on the
operation of the statute as a whole, however, may warrant change. To
illustrate, suppose A and B hold overlapping deeds to the same piece of
marshland and each chain is traceable back beyond the thirty-year period to
a root of title. 157 For as far back as anyone can remember no one has ever
physically taken possession of the disputed strip of land. B's root of title
was recorded in 1945 and. A's in 1941. A recently took possession of the land
by draining and fencing it. B, having learned of the overlapping deeds and
A's possession, claims a marketable record title. Subject to A's "rights" as a
possessor, B's 1945 root of title is held free and clear of all interests arising
out of prior transactions. Yet, if A is successfully to defend his title against B,
not only his possession but his marketable record title must be preserved.

155. Section 712.03(3) apparently applies to those in possession at the time marketability
is being determined. It could also be construed to apply to any person previously in possession as to the time he was in possession. For example, the inquiry notice provided by A's
possession when B purchased the land could later be asserted, despite A's removal from the
premises, to prevent B from claiming that he was a subsequent bona fide purchaser and
to assist A's grantee in protecting his interest.
156. See note 69 supra for the full text of this subsection. The Florida act makes no
provision for the rights of an adverse possessor no longer in possession. The drafters of the
Model Act intended the Act to have no effect on the traditional operation of adverse
possession. That result is obtained in Florida if §712.04 is given precedence over §712.02.
See notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text. Any right of adverse possession wholly or
partially subsequent to the root of title would not be extinguished and the marketability
would be subject to those rights since §712.04 only extinguishes interests that arise prior
to the root. If instead §712.02 controls and title is held free of all claims except those
enumerated in §712.03, the rights of an adverse possessor no longer in possession would
be extinguished, or at least the claimant would hold title free of those rights.
157. This hypothetical closely resembles the facts in Olsen v. Park Daughters' Inv. Co.,
29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 149 (1973). Plaintiff, asserting a marketable record title, and defendants held overlapping deeds to the same piece of land. Each claim was traceable back
beyond the forty-year period. Since plaintiff's root of title was more recent his title
would have prevailed, but the court determined that the defendants had been in possession
of the disputed property for forty years.
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A's "rights" must include not only the fact of possession and notice given
thereby but any recorded instruments that support the right to possession. 53
Hence, A's 1941 root of title cannot be extinguished by B's 1945 root. Unfortunately, it appears that one would need only to be in possession some time
prior to a determination of marketability to prevent the act from extinguishing any interests, however ancient their origin, that the possessor might now
claim.
This problem arises because the MRTA enumerates exceptions to
marketability, not exception to the marketable record title. 159 The rights of
one in possession, regardless of duration, the plainly exceptions to marketability that must be cleared prior to a pronouncement of a marketable title.
Perhaps, however, section 712.04 should not be rendered inoperative by such
rights. 160 Some states provide that continuous possession from the date of the
asserted root forward preserves the possessor's interest.' 6 ' That provision
eliminates the possibility of one taking possession just prior to litigation to
preserve any instruments of record through which he might claim. If an
exception to the operation of section 712.04"62 for the rights of one in possession
is deemed necessary at all,'16 3 the exception should require continuous possession from the root forward. Constructive notice implied from possession
traditionally bound purchasers to notice of whatever interest the possessor
may have had. Nevertheless, the implication of notice should not be allowed
to determine the substance of the possessor's interest.64
158. If, in the alternative, A's "rights" were construed to mean only the fact of
possession, interests arising out of the 1941 deed would be extinguished. If A held directly
through that deed he would be exercising possession as a mere trespasser. If, instead, A's interest arose out of a conveyance subsequent to B's root of title, that conveyance would qualify
under §712.03(4) as an exception to the marketability of title. Again the question is posed;
what rights are preserved under subsection (4) -only those conveyed by an instrument
recorded subsequent to !B's root of title or all those transferred in subsequent conveyances
through which that instrument derives viability?
159. See note 69 supra.
160. Traditionally, possession inconsistent with record ownership (as A's possession
would appear to B) was notice of whatever interest the possessor actually had in the land.
Thus if A had been in possession when B purchased the land, B would hold title subject
to A's interest. Since 1Awas not in possession when B purchased the land, his assertion of
possession now should not add to the efficacy of his title. If A was not in possession, and his
interest would not have been discovered in a search of B's record chain of title, then B, the
subsequent bona fide purchaser, should prevail.
161. Those states are Iowa, Kansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah.
162. It is recognized that marketability must be subject to the interests of one in
possession when marketability is determined. Assuming §712.04 extinguishes only preroot
interests, it need not be prohibited from affecting the rights of those in possession. Similarly,
§712.03(4) need not be an exception to the operation of §712.04 even though it is a desirable exception to marketability. Those interests need only be excepted from the operation of §712.04 if that section is amended to extinguish all interests not preserved by
§712.03.
163. Arguably, such an exception is undesirable. If the party has been in possession
for some time, taxes for the property presumably have been assessed in his name and his
interests would be preserved for three years by §712.04(6).
164. In the hypothetical presented above, B should have prevailed and interests arising
out of A's root of title should have been extinguished. See note 160 supra. If the statute
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Rights of One in Whose Name Taxes Were Assessed
The sixth exception to marketability in section 712.03, unique to Florida's
act, preserves the rights of any person in whose name property taxes for the
10 5
The purpose of
land in dispute were assessed within the last three years.
this section was to protect the interests of one who, although paying taxes
on the land, had been purportedly divested of title through forgery or was
holding title under one of: two parallel chains. Hence the taxpayer's interest
cannot be extinguished by the ascension of a new root of title until at least
three years after assessment in his name ceased.
This exception causes problems similar to those discussed with respect
167
although this exception is much less susceptible to abuse.
possession,166
to
Furthermore, a clear legislative choice was made to preserve all instruments
in taxpayer's chain of title for three years after his last assessment. If within
that period the former taxpayer questioned the change in assessment he
could assert his title against the "new owner" or file a notice to preserve his
claim. If the former taxpayer does neither within three years, the instruments
upon which his claim depends are subject to extinguishment by the claimant's
root of title. A future purchaser is therefore required to determine in whose
name taxes were assessed for the past three years, and takes subject to any
interest such persons may hold.
Under previous interpretations of the recording act, unless such a taxpayer held a recorded interest within the purchaser's record chain of title,
a purchaser would take free of any interests the taxpayer might have. Although
the operation of the recording act is indisputably affected,'6 in this instance
the burden of investigation imposed on the purchaser is slight and the value
of the exception great. Hence, a reasonable search should be defined to include a brief examination of property tax assessments and constructive
notice of interests revealed thereby should be implied in the absence of such
an examination.
CONCLUSION

Clearly a reconciliation of sorts between the recording act and the MRTA
1 69
Any reconciliation that
can be and has been accomplished in the courts.
were amended to require continuous possession, however, policy would dictate a contrary
result. Under the Florida version, the statute merely codifies inquiry notice as provided
by possession. Under the requirement of continuous possession, possession over a long
period of time without question and under recorded instruments is in itself a sufficient
justification for A to prevail.
165. For the text of §712.03(6), see note 69 supra.
166. See note 158 supra and accompanying text.
167. It is probably simpler to take possession of land than to request taxes to be
assessed in one's name and wait until they are in fact assessed.
168. See text accompanying note 149 supra. Here, as in §712.03(4), notice of the taxpayer's interest must be impuled to purchasers if this subsection is not to be mooted by
the recording act.
169. See, e.g., IT Rayonier, Inc. v. Wadsworth, 346 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1977); Marshall
v. Hollywood, Inc., 236 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1970).
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fails to recognize the inherent conflicts between the two acts and to meet
them head-on, however, is of limited value when applied to other circumstances.
It is apparent that a policy choice was made by the drafters of the Model
Marketable Title Act, and by its promoters in Florida, that some traditional
notions of reasonable title search had to be sacrificed to simplify the increasingly cumbersome, expensive, and time-consuming process of title
examination. The costs to the individual vendor or purchaser of land had

become prohibitive.17o The number of transactions in which no title examination was made or title insurance was obtained as protection against outstanding interests was growing. 171 If -the system of recording and conveyancing in general was to remain a viable institution, changes were imperative.
The MRTA sought to clear old defects from land titles and limit the
period of record search to relatively recent instruments. A record owner
who neither possessed land nor paid taxes upon it, nor filed a notice to
preserve his claim, nor recorded any instrument involving the land for more
than thirty years could perhaps be divested of his good title. This result
was justified, however, by the ease with which an interest could be preserved, the negligence of failure to discover adverse claims or bad faith of
failure to question, the cessation of taxation in one's name, and the underlying policy favoring the use of seemingly deserted land. A choice to extinguish interests older than a certain age in order to simplify conveyancing,
notwithstanding the possibility that valid legal claims may be destroyed, is
particularly appropriate for the legislature. Likewise, a choice to include
abstracts within the framework of a reasonable search, forfeiting the op-

portunity to make a reasonable search free of charge, is properly a legislative
decision.
If the Florida legislature made conscious choices with respect to these and
similar policy conflicts when it passed the marketable record title act, then
those choices, as reflected in the language of the act, should be strictly followed
by the courts. 172 If, on the other hand, the MRTA was passed on the urgings
of the Real Property, Probate, and Trust Section of the Florida Bar" 73 without
discussion by the body designed to make choices between public policies, the
legislature should reconsider the act and make those decisions now. In either
170. See generally Simes, supra note 57.

171. See generally Jossman, supra note 56.
172. It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss the constitutionality of marketable
title legislation. Florida courts have yet to rule on the question, noting that it has not
been presented to them. See, e.g., Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 236 So. 2d at 118; Reid v.
Bradshaw, 302 So. 2d at 184. The constitutionality of similar statutes has regularly been
upheld in other states. See, e.g., Lane v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 533
(1941); Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
173. The Florida MRTA was submitted to the Florida legislature by that division of
the Bar. Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 236 So. 2d at 118. Notably, the legislative proceedings
resulted in little debate on the bill. Only two amendments were passed, one extending
the effective date of the act and the other incorporating §712.03(5). The act passed
unanimously although one legislator later withdrew his vote. SENATE JOURNAL 378, 516, 607
(1963). HousE JOURNAL 171, 573, 645, 694, 733, 767, 774, 1055, 1056, 1099, 1411, 1508, 1729

(1963).
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event, an acknowledgment that certain goals have priority over others will
not resolve every possible conflict between the MRTA and the recording act.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are offered for legislative consideration:
1. Amend either section 712.02 or section 712.04 to clarify whether only
preroot matters or all interests not preserved by section 712.03 are extinguished.
Amendment of section 712.04 to provide for extinguishment of all
interests not preserved under section 712.03 is preferable. Then, the enumerated interests of section 712.03 would truly represent all exceptions to marketability and would apprise the examiner of every interest of which he must
be aware and by which a future purchaser could be bound. The root of title
is still a necessary element of the statute as it determines which interests are
preserved under section 712.03.
If section 712.04 is amended as suggested then the following technical
amendments should also be made:
2. Section 712.03(3) should be amended to preserve the rights of an
adverse possessor whose possession was partially or wholly subsequent to
the root of title. Furthermore, the current subsection (3) should be reconsidered and the value of preserving a possessor's rights balanced against
the risks of abuse created by the present language. An amendment requiring
continuous possession back to the root by the current possessor or his
predecessors would prevent such abuses. Such a provision might be thought
too stringent, however, if the fact of possession alone, even for a short period,
is given considerable weight as evidence of a right to possession.
3. Section 712.03(5) should be amended to eliminate unrecorded and
unobservable easements firom its scope. Elimination of all unobservable easements from the scope of this subsection would be even more desirable, but
is perhaps unrealistic.
Consistent with the foregoing reflections of legislative preferences, the
courts should adhere to the literal language of the statute. Reasonable search
should be redefined to include the use of an abstract and an examination of
tax assessments for three years. Subsection (1) of section 712.03 should be
applied, as it was in ITT Rayonier, only to defects apparent on the face of
recorded instruments.
It is imperative that the internal conflicts within the MRTA and the
conflicting interpretations of the act rendered by the judiciary in an attempt
to conform the MRTA to the accepted construction and effect of the recording act be reconciled in the near future. Each day, lawyers rendering opinions
on the marketability of real estate titles rely upon the MRTA to extinguish
claims and interests predating the root of title. Such reliance is perhaps unwarranted in view of the MRTA's unreasonable directive that it shall not be
construed to affect the operation of the recording act, a directive that, if met,
virtually destroys the MIRTA itself. If the legislative and judicial steps outlined above were taken, a harmonic coexistence would be possible.
LoRi TOFFLEMIRE MOORIHOUSE
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